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Kennedy and the Prisons—Moral Exhortation and 
Technical Fastidiousness 
Robert Weisberg 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Justice Anthony Kennedy has been notable and controversial for his views on 
American criminal justice, especially in the area of sentencing. Most of the 
controversy is associated with his majority opinions in capital punishment cases, 
where he has boldly drawn Eighth Amendment lines to carve out types of crimes 
and criminals as categorically off-limits to the death penalty.1 In those cases, 
Justice Kennedy starkly rebuts the retributivist and utilitarian jurisprudential 
rationales proffered for the sentences he is declaring unconstitutional.2 At the 
same time, one particular opinion, concurring in Harmelin v. Michigan,3 might 
suggest that his passion against cruel and unusual punishment is limited to the 
death penalty.4 There, he set a legal standard that has made it difficult, if not 
impossible, to challenge noncapital sentences as unconstitutionally 
disproportionate precisely because he was loath to second-guess the proffered 
jurisprudential rationales for exceptionally long prison sentences.5 Thus, where 
he has denounced punishments, he has done so in broad constitutional terms, 
infused with moral and philosophical principles; where he has resisted Eighth 
Amendment claims, he has done so according to notions of respect and deference 
toward legislative power to set punishment terms.6 
 
 Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. 
1. E.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (precluding the death penalty for crime of child rape 
that did not result in death); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (precluding the death penalty for those 
who commit crimes before age eighteen). 
2. See Kennedy, 544 U.S. 407; Simmons, 543 U.S. 351. 
3. 501 U.S. 957, 996–1009 (1991) (Kennedy J., concurring). 
4. See id. (arguing that because punishment can be supported by multiple penological theories and 
objectives, and because legislatures have primary responsibility in this area, the Eighth Amendment does not 
require strict proportionality between crime and sentence and only grossly disproportionate sentences are 
forbidden). 
5. See id. 
6. Of course, cases like Harmelin can also be read as exhibiting deference toward the states. See id. But 
federalism may be less of a concern than separation of powers in this context, because the Court would likely 
have the same view of federal sentencing legislation. This point merits emphasis in my reading of Plata, where 
one of the key forms of evidence is to the structure for equitable jurisdiction created by Congress. See Brown v. 
Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
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It is fitting that the decision I will discuss here and promote as perhaps his 
most striking pronouncement on American criminal justice is itself a mixture of 
moral and philosophical passion and self-restrained appellate deference. In 
Brown v. Plata,7 Justice Kennedy wrote for a majority upholding a special three-
judge court’s order that the California prison system must undertake a huge 
reduction in the number of state inmates to relieve unconstitutional 
overcrowding.8 In my reading of Plata, I will consider how a Supreme Court 
decision could be characterized in strikingly different ways. For a preview, 
consider some brief quotes. In upholding the lower-court order, Justice Kennedy 
uses the following language: 
This Court’s review of the three-judge court’s legal determinations is de 
novo, but factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Deference to trial 
court factfinding reflects an understanding that “[t]he trial judge’s major 
role is the determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that 
role comes expertise.”9 
In approving the lower court’s flexibility in defining compliance under the order, 
he states: 
Courts should presume that state officials are in a better position to gauge 
how best to preserve public safety and balance competing correctional 
and law enforcement concerns. The decision to leave details of 
implementation to the State’s discretion protected public safety by 
leaving sensitive policy decisions to responsible and competent state 
officials.10 
Proper respect for the State and for its governmental processes require 
that the three-judge court exercise its jurisdiction to accord the State 
considerable latitude to find mechanisms and make plans to correct the 
violations in a prompt and effective way consistent with public safety. In 
order to “give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety,” 
18 U. S. C. §3626(a)(1)(A), the three-judge court must give due 
deference to informed opinions as to what public safety requires, 
including the considered determinations of state officials regarding the 
time in which a reduction in the prison population can be achieved 
consistent with public safety.11 
 
7. 131 S. Ct. 1910. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 1929 (citations omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). 
10. Id. at 1943. 
11. Id. at 1946. 
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And how does Justice Scalia, in dissent, view this decision that is so full of 
boringly mundane exercises and expressions of judicial modesty, institutional 
deference, and technical fastidiousness? “Today the Court affirms what is 
perhaps the most radical injunction issued by a court in our Nation’s history: an 
order requiring California to release the staggering number of 46,000 convicted 
criminals.”12 
So is the Plata decision a by-the-rules, almost ministerial act of judicial 
restraint, or is it a revolutionary judicial coup d’état? As I will discuss below, 
Justice Kennedy’s ability to win a majority for his side of his jurisprudential and 
rhetorical dialectic reflects how his conscience-stricken view of American 
punishment fits his punctilious professional sense of the Supreme Court’s role. 
II. BACKGROUNDS TO THE CASE 
After a decade-and-a-half on the Supreme Court, and while he was 
developing his views of Eighth Amendment proportionality in capital and 
noncapital sentencing, Justice Kennedy started broadly expressing strong and 
public reservations about American punishment. In a widely noted speech at the 
2003 meeting of the American Bar Association, he threw down a gauntlet to the 
legal profession in America.13 Fully acknowledging the different and mutually 
limiting roles of the many actors in our legal system and the branches of 
government, he offered a cri de coeur, a call for conscience to address the 
ravages of incarceration in the United States.14 To quote his most ardent 
language: 
Were we to enter the hidden world of punishment, we should be startled 
by what we see. Consider its remarkable scale. The nationwide inmate 
population today is about 2.1 million people. In California, even as we 
meet, this State alone keeps over 160,000 persons behind bars. In 
countries such as England, Italy, France and Germany, the incarceration 
rate is about 1 in 1,000 persons. In the United States it is about 1 in 143. 
We must confront another reality. Nationwide, more than 40% of the 
prison population consists of African-American inmates. About 10% of 
African-American men in their mid-to-late 20s are behind bars. In some 
cities more than 50% of young African-American men are under the 
supervision of the criminal justice system. 
 
12. Id. at 1949 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
13. Anthony Kennedy, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Speech Before the American Bar 
Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003) (revised Aug. 14, 2003) (transcript available at http://www. 
supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches [hereinafter ABA Speech] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
14. See id. 
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While economic costs, defined in simple dollar terms, are secondary to 
human costs, they do illustrate the scale of the criminal justice system. 
The cost of housing, feeding, and caring for the inmate population in the 
United States is over 40 billion dollars per year. In the State of California 
alone, the cost of maintaining each inmate in the correctional system is 
about $26,000 per year. And despite the high expenditures in prison, 
there remain urgent, unmet needs in the prison system. 
It requires one with more expertise in the area than I possess to offer a 
complete analysis, but it does seem justified to say this: Our resources 
are misspent, our punishments too severe, our sentences too long.15 
Justice Kennedy went on to cite specific governmental causes of these 
miseries—especially mandatory minimum sentencing laws and the phenomenon 
of rigid sentencing schemes that shift de facto sentencing authority from wise 
judges to overzealous and often immature prosecutors.16 
In this speech, Justice Kennedy unabashedly entered the most roiling 
contemporary debate about criminal justice. The current American system of 
prisons and jails is arguably the largest per capita in the world today, and the 
largest in American history.17 Critics of our system have developed the dramatic 
term “mass incarceration” to induce anxiety and shame about the paradox (or 
about whether it is a paradox) that mass incarceration exists in the wealthiest and 
most powerful free-market democracy nation—at a time when crime itself is not 
one of the nation’s pressing social problems.18 Over the past decade, the 
humanities and social sciences have yielded substantial literature examining the 
rise of mass incarceration from various perspectives, ranging from econometric 
analysis of contributory factors to cultural critiques of American exceptionalism 
in penal policy.19 
 
15. Id. at paras. 5–8. 
16. Id. at para. 12. 
17. The American ratio of incarcerated people to total population is about seven times as high as those 
of other industrialized democracies. ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD PRISON 
POPULATION LIST (9th ed. 2010), available at http://www.idcr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/WPPL-9-
22.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). That ratio is about five times higher than the historical average 
for the half–century ending in 1980. See JOHN K. SCHMITT ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON.& POL’Y RES., THE HIGH 
BUDGETARY COST OF INCARCERATION 6 (2010), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/ 
incarceration-2010-06.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (charting the sharp rise in the United States’ 
incarceration rate since 1980). 
18. For an enumeration of recent books by prominent scholars decrying contemporary mass 
incarceration in the United States, see Robert Weisberg, Reality-Challenged Philosophies of Punishment, 95 
MARQ. L. REV. 1203, 1205–06 (2012). 
19. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2010); TODD CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES 
DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007); RUTH GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, 
CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA (2007); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE 
GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2006); GLENN LOURY, RACE, 
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But as the most prominent American official to join the chorus against mass 
incarceration, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that in these remarks, he was going 
well beyond his role in pronouncing on constitutional law: 
The legislative branch has the obligation to determine whether a policy is 
wise. It is a grave mistake to retain a policy just because a court finds it 
constitutional. Courts may conclude the legislature is permitted to choose 
long sentences, but that does not mean long sentences are wise or just. 
Few misconceptions about government are more mischievous than the 
idea that a policy is sound simply because a court finds it permissible. A 
court decision does not excuse the political branches or the public from 
the responsibility for unjust laws.20 
This acknowledgement is revealing because Justice Kennedy might well have 
been loath to invoke the power of the Supreme Court to make direct and 
aggressive constitutional pronouncements about mass incarceration. After all, 
this exceptional degree of incarceration, however grave a moral and social ill, 
does not by itself prove that any governmental agency was violating the Eighth 
Amendment. It was the Plata case that gave Justice Kennedy the opportunity and 
obligation to address the legal manifestations of mass incarceration, but the case 
did so in a subtle and indirect way that enabled him to rely not on broad and 
controversial constitutional themes, but on utterly conventional technical tools of 
adjudication.21 
The death-penalty cases aside, no law-and-order campaigner could fairly 
accuse Justice Kennedy of excessively accommodating prisoners’ claims or 
unduly interfering in state sovereignty in the area of imprisonment. In the context 
of imprisonment legality,22 Justice Kennedy has generally aligned himself with 
the justices who read the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2554, as 
counseling great deference to state criminal court adjudications and to imposing 
high procedural barriers to inmates claiming their custody to be 
unconstitutional.23 
 
INCARCERATION, AND AMERICAN VALUES (2008); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE 
WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); ANTHONY 
THOMPSON, RELEASING PRISONERS, REDEEMING COMMUNITIES: REENTRY, RACE, AND POLITICS (2008); 
BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006); JAMES WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: 
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003).  
20. ABA Speech, supra note 13, at para. 14. 
21. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011); see also infra Part III. 
22. The habeas corpus statute requires that a petitioner establish that he is in state custody when he seeks 
the writ. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006). 
23. Id.; see also, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010) (reversing lower federal court 
decision granting habeas because petitioner’s right of silence had been violated). In fact, in his dissent in Plata, 
Justice Scalia noted acerbically that in a very recent habeas corpus opinion, Justice Kennedy himself had 
written that granting the writ “‘disturbs the State’s significant interest in repose for concluded litigation, denies 
society the right to punish some admitted offenders, and intrudes on state sovereignty to a degree matched by 
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More to the point, while before Plata Justice Kennedy had not been 
associated to any unusual degree with lawsuits in the area of prisoners’ rights, the 
opinions he did write followed the general tendency of the court to look askance 
at these claims. 
Overton v. Bazzetta24 involved a challenge to Michigan prison regulations 
that, among other things, imposed a two-year visitation ban on inmates with two 
drug-abuse violations and denied all visitation with minor nieces, nephews, and 
children for inmates whose parental rights had been terminated.25 The challengers 
claimed that these regulations were not rationally related to legitimate 
penological objectives and violated the free-association guarantee of the First 
Amendment.26 With sympathy for the state’s predicament, Justice Kennedy noted 
the irony in the fact that the drastic increase of Michigan’s prison population had 
strained “resources available for prison supervision and control.”27 He 
acknowledged that prison officials faced a challenge in maintaining order, 
preventing drug smuggling, and protecting children from encountering harmful 
conduct.28 Justice Kennedy had little trouble in agreeing with the State that drug 
and alcohol abuse by prisoners poses a “direct threat to legitimate objectives of 
the corrections system, including rehabilitation, the maintenance of basic order, 
and the prevention of violence in the prisons.”29 
The Court reversed lower court rulings in the plaintiffs’ favor, abruptly 
dismissing the first amendment claim by noting that “[t]he very object of 
imprisonment is confinement.”30 Justice Kennedy observed that “[p]rison 
administrators had reasonably exercised their judgment as to the appropriate 
means of furthering penological goals” and that judges  
must accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison 
administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the 
legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the most 
appropriate means to accomplish them. The burden, moreover, is not on 
the State to prove the validity of prison regulations but on the prisoner to 
disprove it.31  
He concluded that “the regulations promote internal security, perhaps the 
most legitimate of penological goals,” crediting trial testimony “that reducing the 
 
few exercises of federal judicial authority.’” Plata, 130 S. Ct. at 1956 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).  
24. 539 U.S. 126 (1994). 
25. Id.  
26. See id. at 132.  
27. See id. at 129.  
28. Id.  
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 131.  
31. Id. at 132 (citations omitted). 
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number of children allows guards to supervise them better to ensure their safety 
and to minimize the disruptions they cause within the visiting areas.”32 He also 
accommodated the state’s line-drawing among inmates: “To reduce the number 
of child visitors, a line must be drawn, and the categories set out by these 
regulations are reasonable.”33 As for claims that the drug violations triggering the 
ban were minor, Justice Kennedy stressed the Court’s reluctance “to substitute 
our judgment for the conclusions of prison officials concerning the infractions 
reached by the regulations . . . .”34 He ended by accepting the State’s argument 
that inmates had alternative ways of communicating with outsiders; as for the 
effect of broader vitiation rights on prison guards, Justice Kennedy emphasized 
that the Court is “‘particularly deferential’ to prison administrators’ regulatory 
judgments.”35 Finally, he dismissed the Eighth Amendment claim: 
This is not a dramatic departure from accepted standards for conditions 
of confinement. Nor does the regulation create inhumane prison 
conditions, deprive inmates of basic necessities, or fail to protect their 
health or safety. Nor does it involve the infliction of pain or injury, or 
deliberate indifference to the risk that it might occur.36 
Similarly, in Wilkinson v. Austin, Justice Kennedy upheld Ohio’s regulations 
of how the State determines placement of prisoners at its highest security 
prison.37 This is known as a ‘‘Supermax’’ facility.38 Justice Kennedy 
acknowledged that prisoners in Supermax are virtually in solitary confinement.39 
Prisoners brought a class action suit alleging that these protocols still fell short of 
due process requirements, and that the conditions of confinement violated the 
Eighth Amendment.40 The trial court agreed and ordered significant changes in 
the state prison procedures and the conditions for Supermax inmates.41 Justice 
Kennedy recognized that the plaintiffs had a cognizable liberty interest in 
avoiding, if possible, Supermax classification, describing those conditions with 
vividness that foretells the language of Plata: 
For an inmate placed in [a Supermax facility], almost all human contact 
is prohibited, even to the point that conversation is not permitted from 
cell to cell; the light, though it may be dimmed, is on for 24 hours; 
 
32. Id. at 133.  
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 134.  
35. Id. at 135. 
36. Id. at 137 (citations omitted). 
37. 545 U.S. 209 (2005). 
38. Id.  
39. Id. at 214, 224.  
40. Id. at 218.  
41. Id. at 218–20.  
10_WEISBERG_VER_01_6-4-12_EIC_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 7/22/2013 2:38 PM 
2013 / Moral Exhortation and Technical Fastidiousness 
254 
exercise is for 1 hour per day, but only in a small indoor room. Save 
perhaps for the especially severe limitations on all human contact, these 
conditions likely would apply to most solitary confinement facilities 
. . . .
42
 
Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy held that the procedures supplied by the state were 
constitutionally sufficient under the conventional Mathews v. Eldridge standard.43 
After reviewing that standard,44 he rejected any notion that “atypical and 
significant hardships” change this calculus.45 Applying that calculus, he readily 
concluded that these procedures survived the test, especially because the extra 
and independent levels of review of the classification and the opportunity to 
prevent evidence rebutting it  
guard[] against arbitrary decisionmaking while also providing the inmate 
a basis for objection before the next decisionmaker or in a subsequent 
classification review. . . . Ohio further reduces the risk of erroneous 
placement by providing for a placement review within 30 days of an 
inmate’s initial assignment to [a Supermax facility].46 
Justice Kennedy found the state’s interest at stake in these classifications 
powerful and, just as in the irony in Overton, here it was the brutality he turned 
against the plaintiffs.47 
Prison security, imperiled by the brutal reality of prison gangs, provides 
the backdrop of the State’s interest. Clandestine, organized, fueled by 
race-based hostility, and committed to fear and violence as a means of 
disciplining their own members and their rivals, gangs seek nothing less 
than to control prison life and to extend their power outside prison walls. 
Murder of an inmate, a guard, or one of their family members on the 
outside is a common form of gang discipline and control, as well as a 
condition for membership in some gangs. Testifying against, or 
 
42. Id. at 223–24. 
43. 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (designing procedures to determine when individuals can be denied state-
created interests must consider nature of interest, risk of erroneous deprivation of interest, probable value of 
additional or substitute procedures, and fiscal and administrative burdens such additional or substitute 
procedures might place on state). 
44. “First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that 
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.’’ Id. at 335. 
45. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 225 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting the lower court’s decision, 
Wilkinson v. Austin, 372 F.3d 346, 359 (6th Cir. 2005)). 
46. Id. at 226–27. 
47. Id. at 227.  
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otherwise informing on, gang activities can invite one’s own death 
sentence.48 
Finally, he observed that the State had to commit considerable resources to 
Supermax, since it cost approximately forty percent more than the next highest 
level of security prison; he assumed the State must have a well-considered policy 
in place to justify such costs.49 
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
Here is a way of seeing (literally) the subtle artistry of the majority opinion: 
look at the appendices.50 Appendix A reproduces the dry technical language of 
the statute under review, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).51 Appendix B 
consists of photographs of dormitories in two states prisons, Mule Creek State 
prison and the California Institution for Men, showing large numbers of men 
standing next to or lying in double and triple-bunk beds in utterly non-private 
spaces.52 These men are in what are euphemistically, or ironically, called 
“reception centers.”53 They are recent arrivals, many having returned to prison 
from parole because of parole violations and remain in these open rooms for 
weeks or months while awaiting classification into the general population.54 
Appendix C contains photographs of Salinas Valley State Prison.55 It shows the 
“Correctional Treatment Center”—specifically, cages in which mentally ill 
inmates stay until “mental health crisis” beds are available.56 Presumably, these 
cages are for virtually psychotic prisoners who would pose dangers to themselves 
or others if left unconstrained.57 The photographs, which were in the Court 
Record, reflect the shock and outrage of the lower court findings in Plata, as if to 
underscore the settled matter that conditions in the prisons violated the Eighth 
Amendment.58 Yet Appendix A reminds us that the legal question before the 
Court arises from the utterly undramatic world of statutory interpretation. 
 
48. Id. (citations omitted).  
49. Id. at 229 (“It follows that courts must give substantial deference to prison management decisions 
before mandating additional expenditures for elaborate procedural safeguards when correctional officials 
conclude that a prisoner has engaged in disruptive behavior.”). 
50. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947–50 (2011). The Plata Court included Appendices A, B, and 
C. See id. 
51. Id. at 1947–48.  
52. Id. at 1949.  
53. Id. at 1934. 
54. See id. 
55. Id. at 1950. 
56. Id. 
57. See id. at 1924, 1950. 
58. See id. at 1947–50.  
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When the Court decided Plata, California’s prison system had long been 
among the most dysfunctional in the nation.59 Although the actual prison 
population per capita was not anomalously high, the ratio of prisoners to space 
was enormous.
60
 Even after a prison construction boom, new entrants into the 
system far exceeded space; worse yet, California’s system of mandatory parole 
caused a chaotic inflow and outflow of state prisoners for (often technical) parole 
violations, graphically illustrated in Appendix B.61  
But the underlying claims that led to the ultimate Supreme Court case were 
only indirectly about crowding. In Coleman v. Wilson, a suit brought by class of 
seriously mentally ill inmates, the District Court found “overwhelming evidence 
of the systemic failure to deliver necessary care to mentally ill inmates” in 
California prisons.62 Finding such problems as high suicide rates and lack of 
access to crucial medications, in 1995, Judge Karlton appointed a Special Master 
to oversee development and implementation of a remedial action plan.63 Twelve 
years later, the court found insufficient progress.64  
The second class-action lawsuit, Brown v. Plata,65 was a parallel claim about 
overall health and medical care.66 The State conceded that deficiencies in prison 
medical care violated prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights.67 After the parties 
failed to reach a consensual remedy, Judge Henderson, finding a litany of 
preventable medical disasters, appointed a Receiver to redesign and temporarily 
manage the medical care and delivery system in all state prisons.68 In Judge 
Henderson’s words,  
“[T]he California prison medical care system is broken beyond repair,” 
resulting in an “unconscionable degree of suffering and death. . . . [I]t is 
an uncontested fact that, on average, an inmate in one of California’s 
prisons needlessly dies every six to seven days due to constitutional 
deficiencies in the [California prisons’] medical delivery system.”69 
 
59. See id. at 1922 (“This case arises from serious constitutional violations in California’s prison system. 
The violations have persisted for years. They remain uncorrected.”). 
60. Sara Mayeux, Mass Incarceration: Breaking down the Data by State, PRISON L. BLOG, 
http://prisonlaw.wordpress.com/2010/07/13/mass-incarceration-breaking-down-the-data-by-state (last visited 
Aug. 6, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
61. See JOAN PETERSILIA, CALI. POL’Y RES. CTR., UNDERSTANDING CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONS 29, 70–
76 (2006), available at http://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edu/pdf/UnderstandingCorrectionsPetersilia20061.pdf 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1949. 
62. 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1316 (E.D. Cal. 1995). 
63. See id. at 1324.  
64. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1922. 
65. Id. at 1926. 
66. Id.  
67. Id.  
68. See id. at 1931.  
69. Id. at 1926–27 (quoting Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 THE, 2005 WL 2932253, at *1 
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Ultimately, the plaintiff classes persuaded both judges that the 
unconstitutional conditions could not be remedied without some effort to relieve 
prison overcrowding.70 In effect, there was so little space and other logistical 
resources in the prisons for medical facilities and other necessary services that 
even staffing increases could not by themselves solve the problem.71 In theory, a 
State could finesse any release order by increasing space and resources so as to 
relieve the crowding, but at a time of straitened budgets, that alterative might not 
be available. And here the crux of the case lies. This is because a 1995 statute, 
the PLRA, which was passed largely to limit the scope of prisoners’ rights suits, 
actually turned into an opportunity for the plaintiffs.72 Fearing that Eighth 
Amendment suits might allow individual judges to order prisoner releases as part 
of injunctions, Congress set a tough procedural and substantive standard for any 
reduction in prison populations.73  
The PLRA restricts the circumstances in which a court may enter an order 
“that has the purpose or effect of reducing or limiting the prison population.”74 
Under the PLRA, only a special three-judge court may enter an order limiting a 
prison population.75 Before a three-judge court may convene, a district court first 
must have entered an order for less intrusive relief that failed to remedy the 
constitutional violation and must have given the defendant a reasonable time to 
comply with its prior orders.76 The party requesting the three-judge court must 
submit “materials sufficient to demonstrate that [these requirements] have been 
met.”77 If these materials are sufficient, the convened three-judge court must then 
find by clear and convincing evidence that “crowding is the primary cause of the 
violation of a Federal right” and that “no other relief will remedy the violation of 
the Federal right.”78 The three-judge court must find that the relief is “narrowly 
drawn, extends no further than necessary . . . , and is the least intrusive means 
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.”79 In reaching this 
conclusion, the three-judge court must give “substantial weight to any adverse 
impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by 
the relief.”80 
 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005)) (alterations in original) (omission added).  
70. Id. at 1927–28.  
71. Id. at 1926.  
72. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2000); Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1929–31.  
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626; Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1929–31 (discussing procedural requirements of the 
PLRA).  
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(4). 
75. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(B). 
76. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(A). 
77. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(C). 
78. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(E). 
79. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i). 
80. Id. § 3626(a)(A)(1). 
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The Coleman and Plata plaintiffs, believing that a remedy for 
unconstitutional medical and mental health care could not be achieved 
without reducing overcrowding, moved their respective District Courts to 
convene a three-judge court empowered under the PLRA to order 
reductions in the prison population. The judges in both actions granted 
the request, and the cases were consolidated before a single three-judge 
court. . . . 
The three-judge court heard 14 days of testimony and issued a 184-page 
opinion, making extensive findings of fact. The court ordered California 
to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of the prisons’ design capacity 
within two years. Assuming the State does not increase capacity through 
new construction, the order requires a population reduction of 38,000 to 
46,000 persons.81 
Under the statute, the State’s appeal was directly to the Supreme Court.82 
What follows in the long Plata majority opinion is a fascinating interweaving 
of the litany of institutional miseries and embarrassments and a punctilious 
application of statutory rules.83 The rhetorical key to the opinion is that whenever 
Justice Kennedy seems to be engaging in declamatory prose to express the shame 
of American incarceration, he is merely noting the findings made by a lower 
federal court. Here is a brief gallery of Justice Kennedy’s excerpts from the lower 
courts’ findings: 
For years the medical and mental health care provided by California’s 
prisons has fallen short of minimum constitutional requirements and has 
failed to meet prisoners’ basic health needs. Needless suffering and death 
have been the well-documented result. . . .84 
Overcrowding has overtaken the limited resources of prison staff; 
imposed demands well beyond the capacity of medical and mental health 
facilities; and created unsanitary and unsafe conditions that make 
progress in the provision of care difficult or impossible to achieve.85 
Prisoners are crammed into spaces neither designed nor intended to 
house inmates. As many as 200 prisoners may live in a gymnasium, 
 
81. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1927–28 (2011). 
82. Id. at 1928. 
83. See id. at 1928–50.  
84. Id. at 1923. 
85. Id. 
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monitored by as few as two or three correctional officers. As many as 54 
prisoners may share a single toilet.86 
Prisoners in California with serious mental illness do not receive 
minimal, adequate care. Because of a shortage of treatment beds, suicidal 
inmates may be held for prolonged periods in telephone-booth sized 
cages without toilets. A psychiatric expert reported observing an inmate 
who had been held in such a cage for nearly 24 hours, standing in a pool 
of his own urine, unresponsive and nearly catatonic. Prison officials 
explained they had “no place to put him.”87 
Experts from outside California offered similar assessments. Doyle 
Wayne Scott, the former head of corrections in Texas, described 
conditions in California’s prisons as “appalling,” “inhumane,” and 
“unacceptable” and stated that “[i]n more than 35 years of prison work 
experience, I have never seen anything like it.”88 
Other inmates awaiting care may be held for months in administrative 
segregation, where they endure harsh and isolated conditions and receive 
only limited mental health services. Wait times for mental health care 
range as high as 12 months. In 2006, the suicide rate in California’s 
prisons was nearly 80% higher than the national average for prison 
populations; and a court appointed Special Master found that 72.1% of 
suicides involved “some measure of inadequate assessment, treatment, or 
intervention, and were therefore most probably foreseeable and/or 
preventable.”89 
Prisons were unable to retain sufficient numbers of competent medical 
staff, and would “hire any doctor who had ‘a license, a pulse and a pair 
of shoes.’”90 
But the key legal conclusion is that, as required by the PLRA, “[t]he 
overcrowding is the ‘primary cause of the violation of a Federal right,’ 
specifically the severe and unlawful mistreatment of prisoners through grossly 
inadequate provision of medical and mental health care.”91  
 
 
86. Id. at 1924 (citations omitted). 
87. Id. (citations omitted). 
88. Id. at 1924 n.1 (alteration in original). 
89. Id. at 1924 (citation omitted). 
90. Id. at 1927 (citation omitted). 
91. Id. at 1923 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i) (2000)).  
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Moreover, Justice Kennedy was able to invoke a kind of estoppel, because 
implicitly or explicitly so many of these depredations were conceded by the State 
or by current or former state officials: 
The Corrections Independent Review Panel, a body appointed by the 
Governor and composed of correctional consultants and representatives 
from state agencies, concluded that California’s prisons are “‘severely 
overcrowded, imperiling the safety of both correctional employees and 
inmates.’”92 
In 2006, then-Governor Schwarzenegger declared a state of emergency 
in the prisons, as “‘immediate action is necessary to prevent death and 
harm caused by California’s severe prison overcrowding.’” The 
consequences of overcrowding identified by the Governor include 
“‘increased, substantial risk for transmission of infectious illness’” and a 
suicide rate “‘approaching an average of one per week.’”93 
And although the opinion resonates with Eighth Amendment moral outrage 
(abetted by ample citations to Eighth Amendment cases),94 Justice Kennedy could 
say that his opinion drew no Eighth Amendment conclusions at all. The lower 
court established those conclusions; indeed, the State essentially conceded 
them.95 Justice Kennedy, of course, notes that the Supreme Court, while deferring 
to lower-court fact-finding, performs de novo review of questions of law.96 But 
the questions of law here were technical interpretations of a jurisdictional statute, 
not the broad exhortations of the Bill of Rights.97 
Justice Kennedy was left to address a series of state objections to the status 
of the order, especially a complaint that the State had not been given enough time 
to comply with the original single-judge orders in Coleman and Plata.98 Justice 
Kennedy brushed aside this complaint by echoing the lower court judges’ 
impatience: 
The Coleman and Plata courts had a solid basis to doubt that additional 
efforts to build new facilities and hire new staff would achieve a remedy. 
 
92. Id. at 1924 (citations omitted). 
93. Id. (citations omitted). 
94. Id. at 1928. “Just as a prisoner may starve if not fed, he or she may suffer or die if not provided 
adequate medical care. A prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate medical care, is 
incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no place in civilized society. If government fails to 
fulfill this obligation, the courts have a responsibility to remedy the resulting Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. 
(citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 n.9 (1978)). 
95. See, e.g., supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.  
96. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1929. 
97. See id. at 1929–31.  
98. See id. at 1930–47.  
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Indeed, although 5 years have now passed since the appointment of the 
Plata Receiver and approval of the revised plan of action in Coleman, 
there is no indication that the constitutional violations have been cured. 
A report filed by the Coleman Special Master in July 2009 describes 
ongoing violations, including an “absence of timely access to appropriate 
levels of care at every point in the system.”99 
Having addressed the State’s objections, Justice Kennedy turned to the specific 
provisions of the PLRA at issue. He readily affirmed that virtually all the 
dangerous and chaotic conditions in the prisons could be traced to the 
overcrowding problem, finding more than ample documentation in the trial 
record: 
In one facility, staff cared for 7,525 prisoners in space designed for one-
third as many. Staff operate out of converted storage rooms, closets, 
bathrooms, shower rooms, and visiting centers. These makeshift facilities 
impede the effective delivery of care and place the safety of medical 
professionals in jeopardy, compounding the difficulty of hiring 
additional staff.100 
A medical expert described living quarters in converted gymnasiums or 
dayrooms, where large numbers of prisoners may share just a few toilets 
and showers, as “‘breeding grounds for disease.’” Cramped conditions 
promote unrest and violence, making it difficult for prison officials to 
monitor and control the prison population. On any given day, prisoners 
in the general prison population may become ill, thus entering the 
plaintiff class; and overcrowding may prevent immediate medical 
attention necessary to avoid suffering, death, or spread of disease. After 
one prisoner was assaulted in a crowded gymnasium, prison staff did not 
even learn of the injury until the prisoner had been dead for several 
hours. . . .101 
Two prisoners committed suicide by hanging after being placed in cells 
that had been identified as requiring a simple fix to remove attachment 
points that could support a noose. The repair was not made because 
doing so would involve removing prisoners from the cells, and there was 
no place to put them. . . .102 
 
99. Id. at 1931 (citations omitted). 
100. Id. at 1933 (citations omitted). 
101. Id. at 1933–34 (citations omitted). 
102. Id. (citations omitted). 
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The State also unsuccessfully argued that it had been given too little opportunity 
to provide rebuttal facts.103 Justice Kennedy found that both the underlying trial 
records and additional fact-finding at the three-judge court level were more than 
enough to warrant appellate deference.104 Any complaints by the State that in 
discovery it had been rushed and even bullied into submission were met with 
witheringly mundane responses about trial court authority and “orderly trial 
management.”105 
Justice Kennedy read the PLRA as not requiring proof that overcrowding be 
the only conceivable cause of the violations, but that it was “the foremost, chief, 
or principal cause.”106 
As this case illustrates, constitutional violations in conditions of 
confinement are rarely susceptible of simple or straightforward solutions. 
In addition to overcrowding the failure of California’s prisons to provide 
adequate medical and mental health care may be ascribed to chronic and 
worsening budget shortfalls, a lack of political will in favor of reform, 
inadequate facilities, and systemic administrative failures. The Plata 
District Judge, in his order appointing the Receiver, compared the 
problem to “‘a spider web, in which the tension of the various strands is 
determined by the relationship among all the parts of the web, so that if 
one pulls on a single strand, the tension of the entire web is redistributed 
in a new and complex pattern.’”107  
In concluding his statutory analysis, Justice Kennedy affirmed the three-judge 
court’s conclusions that “‘no other relief will remedy the violation of the Federal 
right.’”108 Justice Kennedy affirmed because the State’s arguments that 
construction of new facilities or transfer of prisoners out of state were woefully 
unconvincing and even disingenuous on the facts, because efforts in those 
directions had been pitiful, given the lack of State money and the absence of 
demonstrable political will.109 These arguments were also essentially irrelevant, 
because the State was always free to seek modification of the order to allow for 
those alternatives.110 
 
103. See id. at 1935.  
104. See id. at 1935–36.  
105. Id. at 1935. 
106. Id. at 1936. 
107. Id. at 1936–37 (citations omitted). 
108. Id. at 1937 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(ii) (2000)). 
109. Id. at 1938.  
110. Id. at 1936–39. 
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IV. POINT AND COUNTERPOINT WITH THE DISSENTS 
Perhaps the best way to encapsulate the Plata majority opinion is to see it in 
counterpoint with the resounding dissents. Indeed, the rhetorical artistry of the 
majority opinion lies precisely in its provocation and then deflation of those 
dissents. 
As noted earlier, Justice Scalia was hyperbolic, if not apoplectic: 
One would think that, before allowing the decree of a federal district 
court to release 46,000 convicted felons, this Court would bend every 
effort to read the law in such a way as to avoid that outrageous result. 
Today, quite to the contrary, the Court disregards stringently drawn 
provisions of the governing statute, and traditional constitutional 
limitations upon the power of a federal judge, in order to uphold the 
absurd. 
The proceedings that led to this result were a judicial travesty. I dissent 
because the institutional reform the District Court has undertaken 
violates the terms of the governing statute, ignores bedrock limitations 
on the power of Article III judges, and takes federal courts wildly beyond 
their institutional capacity.111 
In general terms, Justice Scalia went on to denounce the whole phenomenon 
of “structural injunctions” as radically contravening the traditions of equity 
jurisdiction.112 In his view, these injunctions “turn[] judges into long-term 
administrators of complex social institutions such as schools, prisons, and police 
departments. Indeed, they require judges to play a role essentially 
indistinguishable from the role ordinarily played by executive officials.”113 In his 
view, what the District Court and the Supreme Court majority characterized as 
“factual findings” were really empirically unfounded predictions and expressions 
of the jurists’ policy preferences.114 Exasperated by Justice Kennedy’s view that 
the Supreme Court was obliged to defer to such findings, Justice Scalia declaims: 
But the idea that the three District Judges in this case relied solely on the 
credibility of the testifying expert witnesses is fanciful. Of course they 
were relying largely on their own beliefs about penology and recidivism. 
And of course different district judges, of different policy views, would 
have “found” that rehabilitation would not work and that releasing 
prisoners would increase the crime rate. I am not saying that the District 
 
111. Id. at 1950–51 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
112. See id. at 1953–55.  
113. Id. at 1953. 
114. Id. at 1954–55. 
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Judges rendered their factual findings in bad faith. I am saying that it is 
impossible for judges to make “factual findings” without inserting their 
own policy judgments, when the factual findings are policy judgments. 
What occurred here is no more judicial factfinding in the ordinary sense 
than would be the factual findings that deficit spending will not lower the 
unemployment rate, or that the continued occupation of Iraq will 
decrease the risk of terrorism. Yet, because they have been branded 
“factual findings” entitled to deferential review, the policy preferences of 
three District Judges now govern the operation of California’s penal 
system.115 
Justice Scalia was thwarted by Justice Kennedy’s straightforward approach to the 
legal posture of this case. These were indeed “factual findings” by any 
conventional legal definition of the term, and structural injunctions had long ago 
been accepted by the Supreme Court as a necessary means by which federal 
courts could enforce civil liberties.116 
Further, Justice Scalia decried the part of the majority decision that invited 
the State to move for modification so as to extend the three-year deadline to five 
years.117 Since any defendant is free at any time to request modification of an 
injunction, Justice Scalia suggested a more sinister inference: That the majority 
actually wants to overturn the lower court, feels hamstrung by the principles of 
deference it invokes, and is looking for a backdoor way of effecting a reversal to 
“achieve the benefit of a marginal reduction in the inevitable murders, robberies, 
and rapes to be committed by the released inmates.”118 To Scalia, the majority 
opinion is not a balanced, measured legal judgment so much as his colleagues’ 
reaction to their own mixture of cowardice and desperation.119 But here again, 
Justice Kennedy’s counter-position was brilliantly simple: Equity power always 
allows for modification of injunctions.120 This is Justice Kennedy’s version of, 
“Move along folks, nothing to see here!” 
But perhaps most notably, Justice Scalia took Justice Kennedy to task for 
conflating the possibility that some or most of the plaintiffs had individually 
suffered the deprivations caused by overcrowding with the status of all prisoners 
as a class.121 Justice Scalia averred that the former notion “is contrary to the 
 
115. Id. (emphasis in original). 
116. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 126 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Our willingness to 
unleash the federal equitable power has reached areas beyond school desegregation. Federal courts have used 
‘structural injunctions,’ as they are known, not only to supervise our Nation's schools, but also to manage 
prisons.”).  
117. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1956–57 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
118. See id. at 1957.  
119. See id.  
120. Id. at 1923. 
121. Id. at 1952.  
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bedrock rule that the sole purpose of classwide adjudication is to aggregate 
claims that are individually viable.”122 As for the latter, the notion that the effects 
of overcrowding could trickle down to every prisoner, he found this so 
“preposterous” as to reflect a foundational breakdown in separation-of-powers.123 
If . . . a healthy inmate who had suffered no deprivation of needed 
medical treatment were able to claim violation of his constitutional right 
to medical care . . . simply on the ground that the prison medical 
facilities were inadequate, the essential distinction between judge and 
executive would have disappeared: it would have become the function of 
the courts to assure adequate medical care in prisons.124 
In his view, the decision had the perverse effect of granting a gratuitous reward 
of release to tens of thousands of prisoners who suffer no serious medical or 
psychiatric problems and were unaffected by any deficiencies in healthcare.125 
And as if he had not yet been sufficiently sarcastic, Justice Scalia added that 
“many will undoubtedly be fine physical specimens who have developed 
intimidating muscles pumping iron in the prison gym.”126 
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the PLRA requires any prospective relief 
to be “narrowly drawn” and “the least intrusive means necessary to correct the 
violation.”127 Moreover, the courts must “give substantial weight to any adverse 
impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system.”128 To him, 
where a violation infects the entire system and where every prisoner by could 
require medical or mental health treatment while incarcerated, Justice Scalia’s 
objection to the remedy’s scope must have seemed so absurdly formalistic as to 
belie the settled facts of the constitutional violations129: 
Relief targeted only at present members of the plaintiff classes may 
therefore fail to adequately protect future class members who will 
develop serious physical or mental illness. Prisoners who are not sick or 
mentally ill do not yet have a claim that they have been subjected to care 
that violates the Eighth Amendment, but in no sense are they remote 
 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(alterations in original). 
125. See id. at 1952–53.  
126. Id. at 1953. 
127. Id. at 1929 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
128. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
129. See id. at 1940.  
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bystanders in California’s medical care system. They are that system’s 
next potential victims.130 
Indeed, as the State itself acknowledged, “release of seriously mentally ill 
inmates [would be] likely to create special dangers because of their recidivism 
rates.”131 Moreover, Justice Kennedy noted approvingly that despite the alleged 
overbreadth of the remedy, it was not a monolithic order because the lower courts 
had afforded the State great flexibility to allocate the reductions according to its 
judgment about differences among state facilities.132 
Justice Alito was only somewhat less melodramatic in his prose than Justice 
Scalia. While he was unconvinced that the lower court had considered all up-to-
date evidence or that it had paid enough heed to less drastic remedies, perhaps 
the key point of his dissent was the PLRA’s command that a court “give 
substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a 
criminal justice system caused by the relief.”133 Justice Alito lamented that the 
lower court had “ordered the premature release of approximately 46,000 
criminals—the equivalent of three Army divisions.”134 To prove his point, he 
ventured somewhat into the realm of criminology: 
But a more cautious court, less bent on implementing its own criminal 
justice agenda, would have at least acknowledged that the consequences 
of this massive prisoner release cannot be ascertained in advance with 
any degree of certainty and that it is entirely possible that this release 
will produce results similar to those under prior court-ordered population 
caps. After all, the sharp increase in the California prison population that 
the three-judge court lamented has been accompanied by an equally 
sharp decrease in violent crime. . . . If increased incarceration in 
California has led to decreased crime, it is entirely possible that a 
decrease in imprisonment will have the opposite effect.135 
Justice Alito concludes: 
The prisoner release ordered in this case is unprecedented, improvident, 
and contrary to the PLRA. In largely sustaining the decision below, the 
majority is gambling with the safety of the people of California. Before 
putting public safety at risk, every reasonable precaution should be taken. 
 
130. Id. 
131. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting the State’s Reply Brief) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
132. Id. at 1940–41. 
133. Id. at 1959 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2000)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 1966–67 (citations omitted). 
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The decision below should be reversed, and the case should be remanded 
for this to be done. 
I fear that today’s decision, like prior prisoner release orders, will lead to 
a grim roster of victims. I hope that I am wrong.136 
It is ironic that Justice Alito invites the Court to engage in empirical speculation, 
especially when his social science is highly questionable. It is fitting that he loses 
to a majority that treats such empirical speculations as beside the point when a 
lower court makes statutorily-required, garden-variety factual findings, and when 
it relies on the garden-variety tools of equity jurisdiction to modify orders in light 
of changing factual contexts. 
But Justice Kennedy insisted that the three-judge court indeed gave 
“substantial weight” to the public safety issue, noting the amount of time and 
documentation devoted to it.137 But the three-judge court read the statute as 
realistically as possible using the term “substantial” instead of “conclusive,”138 
precisely because no court could ever meet an absolute standard of crime or harm 
prevention when, by definition, the other organs of government themselves could 
not be expected to do so. Indeed, he noted items in the record suggesting that 
reducing overcrowding in California’s prisons could even improve public safety 
in the long run by mitigating the “criminogenic” effect of imprisonment.139 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Recall these words from Justice Kennedy’s 2003 ABA address: 
The debate over the goals of sentencing is a difficult one, but we should 
not cease to conduct it. Prevention and incapacitation are often legitimate 
goals. Some classes of criminals commit scores of offenses before they 
are caught, so one conviction may reflect years of criminal activity. 
There are realistic limits to efforts at rehabilitation. We must try, 
however, to bridge the gap between proper skepticism about 
rehabilitation on the one hand and improper refusal to acknowledge that 
the more than two million inmates in the United States are human beings 
whose minds and spirits we must try to reach . . . . 
A purpose to degrade or demean individuals is not acceptable in a society 
founded on respect for the inalienable rights of the people. No public 
official should echo the sentiments of the Arizona sheriff who once said 
 
136. Id. at 1967–68. 
137. Id. at 1941. 
138. See id.  
139. See id. at 1942 n.10. 
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with great pride that he “runs a very bad jail.” It is no defense if our 
current prison system is more the product of neglect than of purpose. Out 
of sight, out of mind is an unacceptable excuse for a prison system that 
incarcerates over two million human beings in the United States.140 
Brown v. Plata gave Justice Kennedy an unusual opportunity. The California 
prisons presented to him the worst aspects of the dysfunctionality and unfairness 
of American criminal justice. But as a jurist concerned with adhering to the limits 
of his Article II role, he knew that responsibility for redeeming our system lay as 
much, or even more, with other actors in the legal system than with high-level 
appellate judges. He knew that dealing with the details of particular cases and 
sometimes the scrutiny of particular institutions was something that ground-level 
lawyers and judges did. He knew that the fair administration of prisons was 
chiefly the task of state executive-branch officials, and that when confronted with 
grim realities, those officials will often concede prisoners’ claims when the facts 
are clear. He also knew that even where rights are held out as abstract guarantees, 
remedies are a complex institutional matter that often are best left to legislative 
design. The confluence of the roles of lower-court judges, executive-branch 
officials, and aggressive plaintiffs’ lawyers, is what created the opportunity in 
Brown v. Plata.141 Though the decision is crammed with the jurisdictional and 
other legal niceties that that only lawyers can appreciate, Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion nevertheless helps vindicate the broader, holistic view of American 
punishment that he invoked in 2003: 
In seeking to improve our corrections system, the Bar can use the full 
diversity of its talents. Those of you in civil practice who have expertise 
in coordinating groups, finding evidence, and influencing government 
policies have great potential to help find more just solutions and more 
humane policies for those who are the least deserving of our citizens, but 
citizens nonetheless. A decent and free society, founded in respect for the 
individual, ought not to run a system with a sign at the entrance for 
inmates saying, “Abandon Hope, All Ye Who Enter Here.”142 
 
 
140. ABA Speech, supra note 13, at paras. 16–17. 
141. See 131 S. Ct. 1910; see also supra Part III. 
142. ABA Speech, supra note 13, at para. 18. 
